Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) by Calabro, Gina
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Spring 1992 Article 4 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime 
Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) 
Gina Calabro 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Gina Calabro, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 
501 (1991), 2 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 48 (1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol2/iss2/4 
This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE SUMMARIES
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Board,
112 S.Ct. 501 (1991).
Introduction
The plaintiff, Simon & Schuster, Inc., brought suit
against members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board seeking an order declaring New
York's 'Son of Sam' statute violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) the Son of Sam statute was presumptively
inconsistent with the First Amendment;1 and (2)
the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
state's interest in compensating victims of crime.2
Facts
NewYork's Son of Sam law was enacted in response
to the publicity surrounding serial killer David
Berkowitz, known in the media as the 'Son of Sam',
in the summer of 1977. By the time of his capture,
the rights to his story were worth a considerable
amount. The New York legislature was outraged
that Berkowitz would profit handsomely for his
crimes, while the victims went uncompensated.
Thus, the legislature enacted N.Y. Exec. Law §632-
a, the Son of Sam statute.3
Under the Son of Sam law, any entity who contracts
with an accused or convicted criminal for the depic-
tion of a crime must submit to the Crime Victims
Board a copy of the contract, and furthermore,
relinquish any monies under the contract to the
Board.4 The Board deposits the money promptly
into an escrow account. Then, any victim who
receives a money judgment in a civil action against
the accused or convicted criminal within five years
from the date the account is established may
receive money from the account. The account is also
available to pay the accused or convicted criminal's
creditors. The term 'person convicted of a crime'is
defined broadly and applies even to those persons
who are never accused or convicted of a crime, but
who admit to committing a crime in a book or other
work. Most often, the statute has been enforced
against persons who have committed highly
publicized crimes. Ironically, the statute was never
enforced against David Berkowitz.
Henry Hill was arrested and convicted in 1980. He
received immunity from prosecution by testifying
against several former colleagues and has since
entered the Federal Witness Protection program.
In August 1981, Hill entered into a book contract
with author Nicholas Pileggi. The following month,
Simon & Schuster entered into a publishing agree-
ment with Hill and Pileggi, under which both Hill
and Pileggi would receive payments. The result was
Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family. In the book, Hill
recounts his involvement in numerous criminal
activities covering a span of twenty-five years in
one of America's mafia families. The book was a
commercial success, with more than a million
copies in print, and was later converted into the
film Goodfellas.
On January 31, 1986, the Crime Victims Board
notified Simon & Schuster that the publishing com-
pany had violated the Son of Sam statute. The
Board ordered Simon & Schuster to provide them
with copies of all contracts with Hill and to turn
over to theBoard any monies payable to Hill in the
future. The Board also ordered Hill to turn over all
payments which he had already received. Simon &
Schuster complied with the Board's order, then filed
suit in August 1987 claiming the Son of Sam law
violated the First Amendment. Simon & Schuster
sought an injunction barring the statute's enforce-
ment. The District Court entered judgment for the
Board, finding the statute consistent with the First
Amendment. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed.
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.
Legal Analysis
The Court found the Son of Sam statute violated
the First Amendment. First, the Court examined
whether the Son of Sam law established a financial
disincentive to create or publish works with a par-
ticular content; a presumptive violation of the First
Amendment. The Court reiterated its prior ruling
that a "statute is presumptively inconsistent with
the First Amendment if it imposes a financial bur-
den on speakers because of the content of their
speech."5 The Court found the Son of Sam law was
such a content-based statute. It placed a burden on
income derived from the expressive activity of the
accused or convicted criminal without placing a
similar burden on other sources of that person's
income.6 Also, the law was directed at works with a
specific content.7 The effect of the statute was in-
consistent with the First Amendment principle that
government may not use its powers to drive certain
speech from the marketplace of ideas."
The Crime Board unsuccessfully advanced three
arguments in favor of its position. The Board first
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argued that the statute did not result in discrimi-
natory financial treatment; thus seeking to distin-
guish the Son of Sam statute from the discrimin4-
tory tax in Arkansas Writers' Project.9 The Court
discounted this argument because the Son of Sam
law created a financial disincentive to speak for
those who had been accused or convicted of crimes.
Escrowing all the speaker's speech-derived income
rather than taxing only a percentage, as in Arkan-
sas Writers' Project, did not save the statute. The
Board's actions were held to be discriminatory. 10
Next, the Board argued that discriminatory finan-
cial treatment would be violative of the First
Amendment only when the legislature was at-
tempting to censor ideas. The Court dismissed this
argument, holding that legislative intent is not
determinative of whether a statute violates the
FirstAmendment." Finally, the Board argued that
"even if the First Amendment prohibits content-
based financial regulation specifically of the media,
the Son of Sam law is different because it imposes
a general burden on any 'entity' contracting with a
convicted person to transmit that person's
speech." 2 This argument was also found insuffi-
cient. Any 'entity' that entered into a contract sub-
ject to the Son of Sam statute was likely to be a
medium of communication. Furthermore, the
power to impose content-based financial disincen-
tives on speech does not depend on the identity of
the speaker.1
Having found that the Son of Sam law established
a financial disincentive to create or publish works
with a particular content, the statute could survive
only if the state could show a compelling govern-
ment interest and prove the statute was narrowly
tailored to achieve that end. 4 The Court agreed
that the State had a compelling government inter-
est in seeing that victims of crime are compensated
and that criminals do not profit from their crimes.
However, the Board attempted to define the state's
interest more narrowly, claiming that the state had
an interest in "ensuring that criminals do not profit
from storytelling about their crimes before their
victims have a meaningful opportunity to be com-
pensated for their injuries." 5 This interest was not
compelling.16 Although the state had an interest in
compensating victims from the fruits of a crime, the
state did not have an interest in limiting that
compensation to profits from the subsequent ex-
pressive activity of the accused or convicted crimi-
nal.17
Finally, the Son of Sam statute was not narrowly
tailored. In fact, it was "significantly overinclu-
sive."5 The statute was overinclusive for two rea-
sons. First, the Son of Sam law applies to any work
the author might produce which even incidentally
mentions the author's past wrongdoings. Second,
the broad definition of 'person' within the statute
causes it to apply to any author who mentions
participation in wrongdoing, whether or not the
author was actually accused or convicted of the
crime. This could cause ridiculous results. The
Court listed as examples works by David Thoreau,
Emma Goldman, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
all of which included acts of civil disobedience. 9
These works would fall within the scope of the Son
of Sam statute because they mentioned the
author's participation in acts of wrongdoing. Yet, to
include these works within the statute's scope
would not further the goals of the statute. In light
of such potential results, the Court held the statute
was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's
objective of compensating victims from the profits
of crime.2 0
Conclusion
In summary, the Court found New York's Son of
Sam law presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment.2 1 Furthermore, it was not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.Y
However, noting that many states have similar
laws, the Court limited its holding to the New York
law at issue without deciding the constitutionality
of other similar state laws. Recognizing that many
states will look to the Court's holding to formulate
or reformulate their own statutes, Justice Kennedy
in his concurrence stated his belief that the statute
was violative of the First Amendment on its face
and that inquiry into the government interest was
unnecessary. In his opinion, Justice Kennedy
thought it ill-advised to give the states reason to
believe that such speech might be regulated if a
compelling government interest was advanced
which was narrowly tailored.23 9
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